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Abstract
We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures:
the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manip-
ulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental
results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda
control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding which
alternatives can possibly win is NP-hard for both procedures. Whilst deciding if an alter-
native necessarily wins is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time
solvable for the successive one.
JEL Classification: D71, D72
1 Introduction
Two prominent voting rules are used in many parliamentary chambers to amend and decide
upon new legislation: the successive procedure and the amendment procedure [1]. Both are
sequential voting procedures : the alternatives are ordered (thus forming an agenda) and they
are considered one by one, making a binary decision based on majority voting in each step. In
a nutshell, in each step, the successive procedure considers the current alternative and decides
whether to accept it (in which case the procedure stops and the winner is determined) or to
reject it and the procedure then continues with the remaining alternatives in the given order.
The amendment procedure in each step jointly considers two current alternatives and decides by
majority voting which one of the two is eliminated—the remaining one then will be confronted
with the next alternative on the agenda.
There are many reasons to study the properties of parliamentary voting procedures, and
especially to consider computational questions. First, parliamentary voting procedures are used
very frequently in practice. For example, the recent 112th Congress of the US Senate and House
of Representatives had 1030 votes to amend and approve bills. This does not take into account
the hundreds of committees that also amended and voted on these bills. As a second example,
there were 351 divisions within the Houses of Lords and Commons in 2013 to amend or approve
bills.
∗A preliminary short version of this work has been presented at the 24th International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015), Buenos Aires, July, 2015 [10]. In this long version, we provide two additional
fixed-parameter tractability results (Theorem 7 and Corollary 2) and all proofs that were omitted in the conference
version.
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Second, parliamentary voting procedures are used to make some of the most important
decisions in society. We decide to reduce carbon emissions, provide universal health care, or
raise taxes based on the outcome of such voting procedures. When rallying support for new
legislation, it is vital to know what amendments can and cannot be passed. Fortunately, we
have excellent historical voting records for parliamentary chambers. We can therefore make
high quality predictions about how sincere or “sophisticated” voters will vote.
Third, Enelow and Koehler [14] give evidence that parliamentary voting may be strategic:
“Thus, it is shown that sophisticated voting does occur in Congress and in fact is
encouraged by the way amendments are used in the legislative process. It should not
come as a surprise to congressional scholars that congressmen do not always vote
sincerely.”
Fourth, there is both theoretical and empirical evidence that the final outcome critically depends
on the order in which amendments are presented. For example, Ordeshook and Schwartz [31]
remark that
“. . . legislative decisions are at the mercy of elites who control agendas.”
It is therefore interesting to ask if, for example, computational complexity is a barrier to the
control of the agenda or to strategic voting in such parliamentary voting procedures. The former
refers to the Agenda Control problem while the latter to the Manipulation problem. It is
also interesting to ask if we can efficiently compute whether a particular amendment can possibly
(or necessarily) pass despite uncertainty in the votes or the agenda. This refers to the Possible
Winner (or Necessary Winner) problem. We provide one of the first computational studies
of these issues, giving both theoretical and empirical results.
1.1 Related Work
There are many studies in the economic and political literature on parliamentary voting proce-
dures, starting with Black [8] and Farquharson [15], concerning “insincere” or “sophisticated”
or “strategic” voting e.g. [27, 14, 26, 35, 3, 28, 31]. Apesteguia et al. [1] characterize both the
amendment and the successive procedures from an axiomatic perspective.
Miller [27] studies the set of alternatives that may win, the Agenda Control problem. In
particular, he shows that under sincere voting, an alternative can become an amendment winner
under some agenda if and only if it belongs to the Condorcet set (also known as top cycle).
We extend this result by a constructive proof. For the successive procedure, however, he only
shows that every alternative from the Condorcet set can win. Barbera` and Gerber [4] follow
Miller’s research of characterizing the set of alternatives that may become an amendment (or
a successive) winner by controlling the agenda.1 Rasch [34] empirically examines the behavior
of voters in the Norwegian parliament, where the successive procedure is used. He reports that
successful insincere voting, where voters may vote differently from their true preferences and the
outcome is better for them, is very rare.
Using computational complexity as a barrier against Manipulation (that is, changing the
outcome by adding voters) was initiated by Bartholdi III et al. [6]. They show that manipulating
a special variant of the Copeland voting rule is NP-hard. Bartholdi III and Orlin [5] show that
manipulating the Single Transfer Vote (STV) voting rule is NP-hard even the number of voters
allowed to add is one. This voting rule is used in the parliamentary elections of many countries.
It is a sequential voting procedure and works similarly to the successive procedure except that
there is no agenda. Instead, in each step, the alternative that is ranked first by the least number
of voters will be deleted from the profile. The NP-hardness result for manipulating STV is
1Their definitions for both procedures are actually slightly different from ours, the common ones.
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Problem Successive Amendment References
Agenda Control O(n ·m2) O(n ·m2 +m3)♥ Thm. 1 and 2
W. Manipulation O(n ·m) O(n ·m2) Thm. 3 and 4, Cor. 1
Possible Winner NP-c NP-c Thm. 5 and 6
FPT wrt. m FPT wrt. m Cor. 2
Necessary Winner O(n ·m3) coNP-c Thm. 8 and 9
FPT wrt. m Cor. 3
W. Possible Winner NP-c (m = 3) NP-c (m = 3)♠ Thm. 10
W. Necessary Winner O(n ·m3) O(n) for m ≤ 3 Thm. 11
coNP-c (m = 4)♠ —
Table 1: Computational complexity of the considered problems. “W.” refers to the relevant
problem with weighted voters. “NP-c” (resp. “coNP-c”) stands for NP-complete (resp. coNP-
complete). The number of voters is denoted by n, the number of alternatives is denoted by m,
and the sum of weights of all voters in the manipulation is denoted by w. “FPT wrt. m”
stands for “fixed-parameter tractable with respect to m” and means that if the number m of
alternatives is a constant, then the relevant problem is polynomial-time solvable and the degreee
of the polynomial does not depend on m. The result marked with ♥ also follows from the work
of Miller [27]. Those marked with ♠ follow from the work of Pini et al. [32] and Lang et al.
[23]. Entries containing statements of the form “NP-c (z)” (resp. “coNP-c (m = z)”) mean
that the relevant problem is in NP (resp. coNP) and is NP-hard (resp. coNP-hard) even with
only z alternatives. All hardness results already hold when the agenda is a linear order.
of particular interest since we show polynomial-time results for manipulating the successive
procedure. These two complexity results indicate that it is the agenda that makes an important
difference.
Concerning uncertainty in elections (that is, each voter’s preference order may be not a linear
order), there is some work in the political literature [30, 20], but there seems to be significantly
more activity on the computational side. Konczak and Lang [22] consider the Possible Winner
and Necessary Winner problems for the Condorcet rule. The same problems for several other
common voting rules have been frequently studied [36, 7, 19, 2].
Moulin [28] discusses a generalization of the amendment procedure: the voting tree proce-
dure. The amendment procedure is a special case of the voting tree procedure [28]. This general
procedure employs a binary voting tree where the leaves represent the alternatives and each
alternative is represented by at least one leaf, and each internal node represents the alternative
that wins the pairwise comparison of its direct children. The alternative represented by the
root defines the winner. If the binary tree is degenerate and if each alternative is represented by
exactly one leaf, then this procedure is identical to the amendment procedure. To tackle theMa-
nipulation problem with weighted voters, Conitzer et al. [11] provide a cubic-time algorithm
for the voting tree procedure while our quadratic-time algorithm is tailored for the amendment
procedure. Xia and Conitzer [37] provide intractability results for the Possible (resp. Nec-
essary) Winner problem with weighted voters when the given tree is balanced. Pini et al.
[32] and Lang et al. [23] show that the Possible (resp. Necessary) Winner problem with
weighted voters is intractable for a constant number of voters (see Table 1).
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1.2 Our Contributions
We investigate computational problems for two prominent parliamentary voting procedures: the
successive procedure and the amendment procedure. We study three types of voting problems.
First, we study whether there is an agenda under which a given alternative can win when the
voters vote sincerely; we call the corresponding problem Agenda Control. Second, we study
whether a given alternative can win by adding a given amount of voters; we call the correspond-
ing problem Manipulation. Third, we study whether a given alternative can possibly (resp.
necessarily) win when the voters may have incomplete preferences; we call the corresponding
problem Possible (resp. Necessary) Winner. See Table 1 for an overview of our theoretical
results.
Our polynomial-time results for the agenda control problem and the manipulation problem
indicate that the amendment procedure is computationally more expensive than the successive
procedure. From a computational perspective, this implies that the amendment procedure may
be more resistant to strategic voting and agenda control than the successive procedure. If
voters’ preference orders are incomplete, then deciding whether an alternative possibly wins
is NP-complete for both procedures while deciding whether an alternative necessarily wins is
polynomial-time solvable for the successive procedure, but is coNP-complete for the amendment
procedure.
Our experiments on Agenda Control and on Manipulation using real-world voting data
indicate that while both problems are polynomial-time solvable, a successful agenda control is
very rare and a successful manipulation on average needs a coalition containing more than half
of the voters.
1.3 Organization of the paper
In Section 2, we provide definitions regarding voter preferences, preference profiles, and our cen-
tral parliamentary voting procedures. In Section 3, we focus on the Agenda Control problem
when voters are voting sincerely and we study the corresponding computationally complexity
for both parliamentary procedures. In Section 4, we deal with strategic behavior of voters and
investigate the computational complexity of coalitional manipulations. In Section 5, we are
interested in situations with uncertainty, that is, when voters’ preferences and the agenda are
still incomplete. We study the problem of whether an alternative can possibly/necessarily win
in such a situation. In Section 6, we complement our theoretical study with an experimental
evaluation of the Agenda Control problem and the Manipulation problem for real-world
profiles. Section 7 concludes our work and presents some challenges for future research.
2 Preliminaries
Let A := {a1, . . . , am} be a set of m alternatives and let V := {v1, . . . , vn} be a set of n voters.
A preference profile P := (A, V ) specifies the preference orders of the voters in V , where each
voter vi ranks the alternatives according to the partial order≻i overA. For two alternatives b, c ∈
A, the relation b ≻i cmeans that voter vi strictly prefers b to c. Given two disjoint subsetsB,C ⊆
A of alternatives, we write B ≻i C to express that voter vi prefers set B to set C, that is, for
each alternative b ∈ B and each alternative c ∈ C it holds that b ≻i c, and all alternatives in
B (resp. C) are incomparable to each other. We write B ≻i c as shorthand for B ≻i {c} and
c ≻i B for {c} ≻i B.
We say that alternative b beats alternative c (in a head-to-head contest) when a majority of
voters prefers b to c, and call b the survivor and c the loser of the two alternatives. We call b a
Condorcet winner if it beats every other alternative.
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We can use a directed graph to illustrate the comparisons between every two alternatives.
Definition 1 ((Weighted) majority graph). Given a preference profile P = (A, V ), we construct
an arc-weighted directed graph G := (U,E), where U consists of a vertex uj for each alterna-
tive cj ∈ A and where there is an arc from vertex uj to vertex uj′ with weight w if exactly
w voters prefer cj to cj′ , that is, cj ≻ cj′ . We call the constructed graph G a weighted majority
graph for profile P.
If we ignore the weights and the arcs with weights less than |V |/2, then we obtain a majority
graph (without weights) for the profile P. We call the constructed majority graph a tournament
if there is exactly one arc between every two distinct vertices.
We give a small example to illustrate the concept of (weighted) majority graphs.
Example 1. Let P be a preference profile with three alternatives a, b, c, and three voters v1, v2, v3
whose preference orders are specified as follows:
v1 : a ≻ b ≻ c, v2 : b ≻ a ≻ c, v3 : c ≻ a ≻ b.
The weighted majority graph for P consists of three alternatives and six weighted arcs as
depicted in the left figure below. Bold arcs indicate the majority relation.
ua ub uc
2 2
2
1 1
1
ua ub uc
1 1
1
The corresponding majority graph without weights is depicted in the right figure. We can ver-
ify that it is a tournament. Vertex ua has exactly two out-going arcs, meaning that alternative a
beats every other alternative. Thus, it is a Condorcet winner.
Given two preference profiles P and P ′ for the same set of alternatives and the same set of
voters, we say that P extends P ′ if for every i, preference order ≻i from P includes the preference
order ≻′i from P
′. If each ≻i is already a linear order, then we also say that P completes P ′.
Consider a preference profile P := (A, V ). Let A′ ⊆ A be a subset of alternatives. If not
specified explicitly, let
−→
A′ denote an arbitrary but fixed linear order of the alternatives in A′.
Consequently,
←−
A′ denotes the corresponding reversed order of the alternatives in A′. Given an
alternative a ∈ A′ from this set, we say that a is an A′-majority winner if a majority of voters
prefer a to all alternatives from A′ \ {a}, that is, |{vi | a ≻i A
′ \ {a}}| > |V |/2.
We consider two of the most common parliamentary voting procedures. For both procedures,
we assume that a linear order over them alternatives in A is given. We refer to this linear order L
as an agenda. If this order is not linear, then we call it a partial agenda, denoted by B. We use
the symbol ⊲ for the agenda order to distinguish it from the preference order ≻.
Definition 2 (Successive procedure). There are at most m rounds with m being the number of
alternatives. Starting with round i := 1, we repeat the following until we make a decision: Let
c be the ith alternative in the given agenda L. If a majority of voters prefers alternative c to
all alternatives that are ordered behind it in L, then c is the decision and we call it a successive
winner. Otherwise, we proceed to round i := i+ 1.
In Europe, the successive procedure is used in many parliamentary chambers including those
of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Spain [33]. We give a small example to illustrate how
the successive procedure works.
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Example 2. Consider the profile from Example 1 and consider the following agenda L : a⊲ b⊲ c.
Since less than half of the voters prefer a to {b, c} (only v1 does), a is not a successive winner.
Since more than half of the voters prefer b to c (voters v1 and v2), b is the successive winner.
Definition 3 (Amendment procedure). This procedure has m rounds with m being the number
of alternatives. In the 1st round, we let the 1st-round amendment winner be the first alternative
in the given agenda L. Then, for each round 2 ≤ i ≤ m, let the ith-round amendment winner
be the survivor between the ith alternative in L and the (i− 1)th-round amendment winner. We
define the mth-round amendment winner to be the amendment winner.
In Europe, the amendment procedure is used in the parliamentary chambers of Finland,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. It is also used in the U.S. Congress and several
other countries with Anglo-American ties [33]. We use the same example given for the successive
procedure to illustrate how the amendment procedure works. It may be helpful to consider the
corresponding majority graph (see Definition 1).
Example 3. Consider the profile and the agenda given in Example 2 for the successive procedure.
Alternative a is the 1st-round winner since it is the first alternative on the agenda. Since a
majority of voters prefers a to b, a is also the 2nd-round winner. Since a majority of voters also
prefers a to c, a is the 3rd-round and hence, the amendment winner. Indeed, as one can see from
the majority graph shown in Example 1, alternative a is a Condorcet winner. Consequently, it
is always an amendment winner no matter how the agenda looks like.
For the remainder of this paper, we assume that the number of voters is odd to reduce the
impact of ties, and break remaining ties. Furthermore, we consider both unweighted voters and
voters with integer weights. The weighted case is especially interesting in the parliamentary
setting: First, there are parliamentary chambers where voters are weighted (for instance, in the
Council of Europe, preference orders are weighted by the size of the country). Second, voters
will often vote along party lines. This effectively gives us parties casting weighted preference
orders. Third, the weighted case can inform the situation where we have uncertainty about the
preference orders. For example, Theorem 15 of Conitzer et al. [11] proves that if the manipulation
problem for a voting rule is NP-hard for weighted voters who have complete preference orders,
then deciding who possibly wins in the unweighted case is NP-hard even when there is only a
limited form of uncertainty about the preference orders. It would be interesting to prove similar
results about uncertainty and weighted preference orders in parliamentary voting procedures.
3 Agenda Control
The order of the alternatives, that is, the agenda, may depend on the speaker, the Government,
logical considerations (for instance, the status quo goes last, the most extreme alternative comes
first), the chronological order of submission, or other factors. The agenda used can have a major
impact on the final decision. It is worth noting also that there are many possible agendas. For
example, suppose voters are sincere and we use the successive procedure. Then the Condorcet
winner is only guaranteed to win if it is introduced in one of the last two positions in the agenda.
We therefore consider the following computational question for the situation where voters vote
sincerely.
Agenda Control
Input: A preference profile P := (A, V ) with linear preference orders and a preferred
alternative p ∈ A.
Question: Is there an agenda for A such that p is the overall winner?
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We find that both voting procedures are “vulnerable” to agenda controls. In particular, we
show how to find in polynomial time an appropriate agenda (if it exists) such that the preferred
alternative can become a successive (resp. amendment) winner. In the remainder of this section,
we assume that a preference profile P := (A, V ) with linear preference orders and a preferred
alternative p ∈ A are given. We denote by n the number of voters and by m the number of
alternatives in P .
3.1 Successive procedure
The basic approach to controlling the successive procedure is to build an agenda from back to
front such that each of the alternatives that are currently among the highest positions in the
partial agenda may be strong enough to beat p alone but is too weak to be a majority winner
against the whole set of alternatives behind it. To formalize this idea, we need some observations.
Observation 1. Let b, c be two alternatives such that b beats c. Then, as long as b is behind c
in the agenda, c can never be a successive winner.
Proof. Let L be an agenda where b is positioned behind c. Suppose that no alternative in front
of c in agenda L is a successive winner. In the round where c is considered, c is not ranked first
by a majority of voters because b beats c and b is not yet deleted, implying that c will be deleted
and is not a successive winner.
We can generalize the above observation to a subset of alternatives.
Lemma 1. Let A′ ⊆ A be a subset of alternatives. Let b be an alternative in A \A′ such that b
ist not an (A′ ∪ {b})-majority winner. Then,
1. alternative b is not a successive winner under every agenda L that extends the partial
order b⊲A′, and
2. if such an alternative b does not exist and if A \ A′ 6= ∅, then no alternative from A′ can
be a successive winner.
Proof. The first statement is easy to see from the definition of a successive winner. For the
second statement, assume that A \A′ 6= ∅ and that
every alternative c ∈ A \A′ is an (A′ ∪ {c})-majority winner. (⋆)
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is an agenda L under which the successive
winner a′ would come from A′. This implies that a′ beats every alternative behind it in L; by
assumption (⋆), a′ is beaten by every alternative in A \ A′. This further implies that L : (A \
A′)⊲a′. Let d be the last alternative in A \A′ that is still in front of a′, that is,
L satisfies ((A \A′) \ {d})⊲d⊲a′.
By assumption (⋆), d would become a successive winner if all alternatives in front of it in
agenda L are deleted (note that all alternatives behind d come from A′)—a contradiction to a′
being a successive winner.
By the above lemma, we can construct an agenda from back to front by first placing our
preferred alternative p at the last position and setting A′ := {p}. We will extend the agenda
by putting those alternatives c that are not (A′ ∪ {c})-majority winners right in front of A′.
Using this approach we can solve the agenda control problem for the successive procedure in
polynomial time.
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Theorem 1. Agenda Control can be solved in O(n ·m2) time for the successive procedure,
where n denotes the number of voters and m the number of alternatives.
Proof. We first describe the algorithm and then analyze its correctness and its running time.
Let A′ := {p} and let the agenda L consist of only one alternative, namely p. Execute the
following steps.
(1) If A′ = A, then we have constructed an agenda L under which p can win and we answer
“yes”.
(2) If A \A′ 6= ∅ and if every alternative c ∈ A \A′ is an A′ ∪{c}-majority winner, then we stop
and answer “no”.
(3) Otherwise, for each alternative c ∈ A\A′ that is not an A′∪{c}-majority winner, we extend
the agenda L by putting alternative c right in front of all alternatives in A′ and we let
A′ := A′ ∪ {c}. Proceed with Step (1).
For the correctness, if Step (2) ever applies, then by the second statement in Lemma 1, no
alternative in A′ ∋ p can win, implying that p can never win. Thus, we can safely reply with
“no”.
If Step (2) never applies, we show that if p is a successive winner of a profile restricted to
the alternative set A′, then it is also a successive winner of the profile that additionally contains
a non-(A′ ∪ {c})-majority winner: let c be an alternative in A \ A′ that is not an (A′ ∪ {c})-
majority winner. Assume that p is a successive winner under the current agenda L for the
profile P ′ restricted to the alternatives in A′. Then, by the first statement in Lemma 1, it
follows that under every agenda that extends c⊲A′, c is not a successive winner. This means
that the procedure would delete c and go on with the alternatives in A′. By assumption, p
is a successive winner for profile P ′ and agenda L. Therefore, in the profile restricted to the
alternatives in A′ ∪ {c}, the agenda p⊲L also makes p win.
We now come to the running time analysis. First, if Steps (1) and (3) do not apply, then
Step (2) applies which leads to termination. Second, in Step (3), for every alternative c ∈ A\A′,
we check whether it is an A ∪ {c}-majority winner. This check can be done in O(n) time: We
maintain a list T of size n that stores for each voter v, the highest position of alternative from
A′ ranked by v. We iterate over every voter v and compare the position v(c) of c ranked by v
and the position T (v) stored by T for voter v. We count the number of times where v(c) < T (v).
If this number is smaller than n/2, then c is not an A′ ∪ {c}-majority winner; we add c to A′
and we update the list T by changing the entry T (v) where v(c) < T (v).
Since we may execute Step (3) at most m times (at most m alternatives may be added to
A′), the total running time is O(n ·m2).
3.2 Amendment procedure
Controlling the amendment procedure is closely related to finding a Hamiltonian cycle in a
strongly connected tournament. To see this, we first construct a majority graph for the given
preference profile (see the corresponding definition in Section 2). Recall that we assume the
number of voters to be odd. The majority graph has m vertices and
(
m
2
)
arcs and is indeed
a tournament. From the theory of directed graphs [18, Thm. 7], we can conclude that every
strongly connected tournament contains a Hamiltonian cycle. Now, the crucial idea is to check
whether the vertex that corresponds to p belongs to a strongly connected component that has
only out-going arcs. Alternative p can win under an appropriate agenda if and only if this is the
case.
Observation 2 (Theorem 7, [18]). Every strongly connected tournament contains a Hamiltonian
cycle.
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By carefully examining the constructive proof for Observation 2, we can find a Hamiltonian
cycle in O(m+m2 +m · (m+m2)) = O(m3) time.
Utilizing the fact that the underlying undirected graph for a tournament is complete, we
obtain the following:
Observation 3. Every tournament can be partitioned into disjoint strongly connected strong
subtournaments T1 := (U1, A1), T2 := (U2, A2), . . . , Tt := (Ut, At), such that
1. for every two subtournaments Ti and Tj, in the original tournament, either all arcs are
from the vertices of Ti to the vertices of Tj or the other way round; and
2. the graph resulting from deleting all but one vertex from each subtournament Ti, is a
directed acyclic graph.
From this observation, we can derive the next theorem. Note that Miller [27] already char-
acterized the set of alternatives that can become an amendment winner under an appropriate
agenda. Our theorem strengthens this result by giving a polynomial-time algorithm.
Theorem 2. Agenda Control can be solved in O(n · m2 + m3) time for the amendment
procedure, where n denotes the number of voters and m the number of alternatives.
Proof. By Observation 3, every tournament consists of strongly connected subtournaments which
can be ordered by topological sorting. Now, observe that only the alternatives corresponding to
the vertices from the top-most strongly connected subtournament can become an amendment
winner. In other words, if the vertex corresponding to the preferred alternative p does not belong
to the top-most subtournament, then p can never win. By carefully examining the constructive
proof for Observation 2, we can find a Hamiltonian cycle for a strongly connected tournament
in O(m3) time. Now, we construct a sequence Lver of vertices by reversing the orientation of
the Hamiltonian cycle, starting with the predecessor of the vertex up corresponding to p and
ending at the vertex up, and let Lalt be the order of the alternatives corresponding to Lver. We
can verify that p is an amendment winner for every agenda that extends order Lalt.
Thus, the problem is reduced to finding strongly connected subtournaments of the majority
graph for the given preference profile: If the vertex corresponding to p is in the top-most sub-
tournament, then construct an arbitrary but fixed order that extends Lalt and we answer “yes”.
Otherwise we answer “no”.
Now, we come to the running time. Constructing a majority graph for a profile takes O(n·m2)
time. Partitioning the majority graph into strongly connected components takes O(m + m2)
time and checking whether the vertex corresponding to p belongs to the top-most component
takes O(m) time. Finally, finding a Hamiltonian cycle in a strongly connected tournament
takes O(m3) time. Thus, in total, the approach to controlling the amendment procedure takes
O(n ·m2 +m3) time.
We close this section with two remarks. First, the approach for the successive procedure
actually works for both odd as well as even number of voters. Second, our approach for the
amendment procedure can be extended to the case where the number of voters is even. There,
alternative p is a winner if and only if no strongly connected component “dominates” the strongly
connected component that contains up.
4 Manipulation
In this section, we consider the question of how difficult it is computationally for voters to vote
strategically to ensure a given outcome supposing that the other voters vote sincerely.
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Manipulation
Input: A profile P := (A, V ) with linear preference orders, a non-negative integer k ∈ N,
a preferred alternative p ∈ A, and an agenda L for A.
Question: Is it possible to add a coalition of (that is, a set of) k voters such that p wins
under agenda L?
We find that deciding whether a manipulation is successful is polynomial-time solvable for
both the successive procedure and the amendment procedure. However, our approach to decid-
ing whether the amendment procedure can be successfully manipulated is asymptotically more
complex than our approach to deciding the same question for the successive procedure.
First, we observe that the manipulators can basically vote in the same way.
Observation 4. If there is a successful (weighted) manipulation, then there is also a successful
one where all voters from the coalition rank the alternatives in the same way.
Proof. For the successive procedure, if there is a successful manipulation for the preferred alter-
native p, then requiring all manipulators to rank p in the first position and to rank the other
alternatives in an arbitrary but fixed order also makes p win.
Now, let P ′ be the manipulated profile, that is, the original profile plus the manipulators.
Let X := {x1, x2, . . . , xs} consist of all alternatives xi ∈ A such that there is a round index ri
where xi is an rith-round amendment winner in P ′. Assume without loss of generality that for
every 2 ≤ i ≤ s, alternative xi beats xi−1. If p is an amendment winner in P ′, then p = xs.
Furthermore, we can verify that each xi is an rith-round amendment winner in the original
profile plus the k manipulators who all have preference order xs ≻ xs−1 ≻ . . . ≻ x1 ≻
−−−→
A \X.
This implies that xs = p is an amendment winner.
We also observe that the best way of manipulating the successive procedure is to let the
manipulators rank their most preferred alternative at the first position.
Theorem 3. Manipulation can be solved in O(n ·m) time for the successive procedure, where
n denotes the number of voters and m the number of alternatives.
Proof. In the proof of Observation 4, we can observe that if a coalition of k voters can ma-
nipulate the successive procedure, then by ranking alternative p in the first position and the
other alternatives in an arbitrary but fixed order, p must also win. This leads to a linear-time
O((k + n) ·m) algorithm: Let the coalition all vote p ≻
−−−−→
A \ {p}, and check whether p may win
the successive procedure. Since a successful manipulation is always possible when k ≥ n + 1,
the linear running time is indeed O(n ·m).
For the successive procedure, how the manipulators should vote does not depend on the
sequence of the alternatives in the agenda. For the amendment procedure, however, a successful
manipulation depends greatly on the agenda. To formalize this idea, we need one more notion:
Definition 4. Let (P := (A, V ), k, p,L) be an instance of Manipulation under the amendment
procedure. We call an alternative c ∈ A an ith-round manipulated winner if adding a coalition
of k additional voters to the original profile P makes this alternative the ith-round amendment
winner under agenda L.
The crucial point is that an alternative that is not an ith-round manipulated winner can
never become a jth-round manipulated winner with j > i. Further, it is easy to check whether
an ith-round manipulated winner alternative can survive as a manipulated winner of a later
round as the following shows.
Lemma 2. Let b be the ith alternative in the agenda L, 2 ≤ i ≤ m. Then,
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm for computing all manipulated winners for the amendment pro-
cedure.
Input: (P = (A, V ), k, p,L) — an instance of Manipulation
1 Set W1 := {the first alternative in the agenda L}
2 Set ≻b1:= ∅
3 foreach round i ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,m} do
4 Set Wi := ∅
5 Set b := the ith alternative in L
6 foreach (i− 1)th-round manipulated winner c ∈ Wi−1 do
7 if b /∈Wi and b beats c when all manipulators prefer b to c then
8 Add b to the set Wi
9 Construct the preference order ≻bi := {c ≻ b}∪ ≻
c
i−1
10 if c beats b when all manipulators prefer c to b then
11 Add c to the set Wi
12 Construct the preference order ≻ci := {c ≻ b}∪ ≻
c
i−1
1. b is an ith-round manipulated winner if and only if there is an (i− 1)th-round manipulated
winner c such that requiring all manipulators to prefer b to c makes b beat c.
2. an (i − 1)th-round manipulated winner c is also an ith-round manipulated winner if and
only if requiring all manipulators to prefer c to b makes c beat b.
Proof. We only show the first statement as the second one can be shown analogously. For the
“only if” part, assume that b is an ith-round manipulated winner and let P ′ be the manipulated
profile. Now, we rename and enumerate all jth-round amendment winners in P ′ with j ≤ i− 1
as x1, x2, . . ., xs such that for each 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ s − 1, alternative xℓ+1 beats xℓ in P
′. By
definition, xs is the (i − 1)th-round amendment winner. Now observe that b is an ith-round
amendment winner in the manipulated profile, where every manipulator has preference order
b ≻ xs ≻ xs−1 ≻ . . . ≻ x1 ≻
−−−→
A \X.
For the “if” part, let c be an (i−1)th-round manipulated winner and consider the correspond-
ing manipulators’ preference orders ≻′1,≻
′
2, . . . ,≻
′
k that only rank the first (i − 1) alternatives
in the agenda. If requiring every manipulator to prefer b to c can make b beat c, then at round
i, b will survive as the ith-round amendment winner when every manipulator i has a preference
order extending ≻′i ∪{b ≻ c}. This implies that b is an i
th-round manipulated winner.
By the above lemma, we can indeed compute in quadratic time all alternatives that can
become an amendment winner by adding k additional voters to the profile, and we can compute
the corresponding coalition for each of these alternatives.
Theorem 4. Manipulation can be solved in O(n · m2) time for the amendment procedure,
where n denotes the number of voters and m the number of alternatives.
Proof. Based on Lemma 2 we can build a recursive algorithm that constructs a linear order over
the first i alternatives from L for each ith-round amendment winner, i starting from 1.
We denote by Wi the set of all i
th-round manipulated winners. For each ith-round manipu-
lated winner c, we denote by ≻ci the preference order over the first i alternatives in the agenda L
such that c becomes an ith-round amendment winner by adding k manipulators with preference
order that extend ≻ci .
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The approach to computing all manipulated winners is described in Algorithm 1. Obviously,
for the first round, the set W1 and its corresponding preference order are computed correctly.
By Lemma 2 (1), we know that Steps (7)-(9) are correct, and by Lemma 2(2), we know that
Steps (10)-(12) are correct. Since each alternative from Wm is a last-round manipulated winner,
we answer “yes” to the instance (P = (A, V ), k, p,L) if p ∈Wm and “no” otherwise.
Now, we come to the running time. First of all, for each two distinct alternatives b, c, we
check whether adding k manipulators can make b beat c; let the Boolean variable T (b, c) have
value one if this is the case and zero otherwise. Computing all these Boolean values runs in
O((k + n) ·m2).
Then, to compute Wi, 2 ≤ i ≤ m, we check T (b, c) for every alternative c in Wi−1 and for
the ith alternative b in the agenda L. Thus computing all Wi can be done in O(m
2) time. Since
a successful manipulation is always possible when k ≥ n + 1, the total running time is indeed
O(n ·m2).
In theWeighted Manipulation problem, the voters of the coalition also come with integer
weights. However, we remark here that the weighted and non-weighted cases are equivalent
because of Observation 4. Observe that if the sum of the weights is greater than the number
of the voters in the original profile, then a successful manipulation is always possible. Thus, we
can conclude the following.
Corollary 1. Weighted Manipulation can be solved in O(n · m) time for the successive
procedure and in O(n ·m2) time for the amendment procedure, where n denotes the number of
voters and m the number of alternatives.
5 Possible/Necessary Winner
We typically have partial knowledge about how the voters will vote, and about how the agenda
will be ordered. Nevertheless, we might be interested in what may or may not be the final
outcome. Does our favorite alternative stand any chance of winning? Is it inevitable that the
government’s alternative will win? Is there an agenda under which our alternative can win?
Hence, we consider the question of which alternative possibly or necessarily wins.
Possible (resp. Necessary) Winner
Input: A preference profile P := (A, V ), a preferred alternative p ∈ A, and a partial
agenda B.
Question: Can p win in a (resp. every) completion of the profile P for an (resp. every)
agenda which completes B?
An upper bound for the computational complexity of both problems is easy to see: Possi-
ble Winner (resp. Necessary Winner) for both the successive procedure and the amend-
ment procedure is contained in NP (resp. in coNP) because determining a winner for both
procedures is polynomial-time solvable. Thus, in order to show the NP-completeness (resp.
coNP-completeness), each time we only need to show the NP-hardness (resp. coNP-hardness).
5.1 Possible Winner
Our first two results imply that as soon as the voters may have non-linear preference orders,
deciding who may be a possible winner is NP-hard even for a fixed agenda. The last result shows
that if the number m of alternatives is a constant, then this problem becomes polynomial-time
solvable and the degree of the polynomial does not depend on m.
Theorem 5. Possible Winner with a fixed agenda is NP-complete for the successive procedure.
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Proof. We show the NP-hardness by reducing from the NP-complete Independent Set problem
in polynomial time. Given an undirected graph G = (U,E) and an integer h, Independent
Set asks whether there is an independent set of size at least h, that is, a subset of at least
h vertices such that no two of them are adjacent to each other. We will give a concrete example
for the reduction right after the proof.
Let (G = (U,E), h) be an instance of the Independent Set problem, where U = {u1, . . . , ur}
denotes the set of vertices and E = {e1, . . . , es} denotes the set of edges. We assume that r ≥ 3
and 2 ≤ h ≤ r − 1. We construct a Possible Winner instance ((A, V ), p,B) as follows. The
set A of alternatives consists of the preferred alternative p, one dummy alternative d, and for
each edge ej ∈ E one edge alternative cj :
A := {p, d} ∪ {cj | ej ∈ E}.
We construct three groups of voters, where only the first group of voters has partial orders while
the remaining two groups have linear orders.
1. For each vertex ui ∈ U , we construct a vertex voter vi with a partial preference order
specified by
−−−→
I(ui) ≻ p ≻
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
A \ ({p, d} ∪ I(ui)) and d ≻
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
A \ ({p, d} ∪ I(ui)),
where I(ui) denotes the set of edge alternatives corresponding to edges incident to ver-
tex ui. Briefly put, vertex voter vi prefers all “incident” edge alternatives to all other
alternatives (including p) except d but he thinks that every “incident” edge alternative
and p are incomparable to d.
2. We construct h− 2 auxiliary voters with the same complete preference order
−−−−−−→
A \ {p, d} ≻ d ≻ p.
3. We construct another r − h− 1 auxiliary voters with the same complete preference order
−−−−−−→
A \ {p, d} ≻ p ≻ d.
Note that we have constructed a total of 2r − 3 voters. Thus, to be a majority winner, an
alternative needs to be preferred at the first place by at least r − 1 voters.
Let the agenda B be the linear order c1⊲ c2 ⊲ . . . ⊲ cs ⊲p⊲d. This completes the construction
which can clearly be computed in polynomial time.
Before we give a formal correctness proof, let us briefly sketch the idea. Our construction
ensures that in order to beat d in the final round of the procedure we have to put p (and by the
construction of the vertex voters, also I(ui)) in front of d in at least h vertex voters’ preference
orders. However, to prevent any edge alternative cj from being an amendment winner in some
earlier round of the procedure, we cannot put any edge alternative in front of d more than once.
We will see that this is only possible if the vertices corresponding to the voters for which we put
p in front of d form an independent set of size h.
Now, we show that G has an independent set of size at least h if and only if p can possibly
win in the constructed instance.
For the “only if” part, assume that G admits an independent set U ′ ⊆ U of size at least h.
Then, we complete the partial preference orders of the vertex voters to make p a successive
winner as follows.
1. For each vertex ui ∈ U ′ belonging to the independent set, let voter vi have the preference
order −−−→
I(ui) ≻ p ≻ d ≻
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
A \ ({p, d} ∪ I(ui)).
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Figure 1: An undirected graph with 6 vertices and 8 edges. The graph has an independent set
of size 4 (filled in gray) and has a vertex cover of size 2 (filled in white).
2. For each vertex ui /∈ U ′ not belonging to the independent set, let voter vi have the
preference order
d ≻
−−−→
I(ui) ≻ p ≻
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
A \ ({p, d} ∪ I(ui)).
Since U ′ is an independent set, every edge alternative is preferred to d by at most one vertex
voter. Together with the remaining r− 3 auxiliary voters, every edge alternative is preferred to
d by at most r − 2 voters, causing each edge alternative to be deleted if it is considered prior
to d in an agenda (note that we have 2r − 3 voters). Hence, by our agenda where all edge
alternatives are in front of d, each edge alternative is indeed deleted. Now, we come to the last
but one round. Since the independent set U ′ has size at least h, at least h vertex voters prefer
p to d. Then, p will beat d, because the first r − h− 1 auxiliary voters prefer p to d, making p
a successive winner.
For the “if” part, assume that p can possibly become a successive winner which means that
one can complete the vertex voters’ preference orders, ensuring p’s victory. Let V ′ be the set of
vertex voters that prefer p to d in such a completion. Since a total of r − h− 1 auxiliary voters
prefer p to d, in order to make p beat d at the last but one round, |V ′| must be at least h (note
that the majority quota is r − 1). Now, consider the vertex subset U ′ that corresponds to V ′.
We show that U ′ is an independent set, that is, no two vertices in U ′ are adjacent. Suppose for
the sake of contradiction that there are two adjacent vertices u, u′ ∈ U ′; denote the edge by ej.
Then, back to our completed profile, since p is a successive winner, one must come to the round
where the corresponding edge alternative cj is considered. Since all edge alternatives with a
lower index are already deleted, by construction of the preference orders, a total of (r−1) voters
(the two vertex voters corresponding to u, u′ and all r − k − 3 auxiliary voters) rank cj at the
first position in the profile restricted to the alternatives cj , cj+1, . . . , cs, p, d. This, however, will
make cj win—a contradiction.
We illustrate the above NP-hardness reduction through an example. Figure 1 depicts an
undirected graph G with 6 vertices and 8 edges. We set h := 4. The gray vertices form an
independent set of size 4. Then a reduced instance for Possible Winner and for the successive
procedure will have 6+(4−2)+(6−4−1) = 9 voters and 2+8 = 10 alternatives. This instance
can be found in Table 2.
Now, we show that for the amendment procedure, Possible Winner remains intractable.
Theorem 6. Possible Winner with a fixed agenda is NP-complete for the amendment proce-
dure.
Proof. We show the NP-hardness by reducing from the NP-complete Vertex Cover problem
in polynomial time. Given an undirected graph G = (U,E) and an integer h, Vertex Cover
asks whether there is a vertex cover of size at most h, that is, a subset of at most h vertices
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Voter v1 : { c1≻ c3 ≻ c5≻ c7≻p, d }≻ c2 ≻ c4≻ c6≻ c8
Voter v2 : { c2≻ c4 ≻ c6≻ c8≻p, d }≻ c1 ≻ c2≻ c3≻ c4
Voter v3 : { c1≻ c2 ≻p, d }≻ c3≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6≻ c7≻ c8
Voter v4 : { c3≻ c4 ≻p, d }≻ c1≻ c2 ≻ c5 ≻ c6≻ c7≻ c8
Voter v5 : { c5≻ c6 ≻p, d }≻ c1≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4≻ c7≻ c8
Voter v6 : { c7≻ c8 ≻p, d }≻ c1≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4≻ c5≻ c6
One voter: c1 ≻ c2≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5≻ c6≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻p≻d
Two voters: c1 ≻ c2≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5≻ c6≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻d≻p
Agenda B : c1 ⊲ c2⊲ c3 ⊲ c4 ⊲ c5⊲ c6⊲ c7 ⊲ c8 ⊲p⊲d
Table 2: The instance ((A, V ), p,B) for the problem Possible Winner and for the
successive procedure, obtained from the graph in Figure 1 and h = 4, where A =
{c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, p, d}, the voter set V and the corresponding preference orders and
the agenda are depicted above. By the construction of the agenda, one may notice that in order
to let p beat d in the last two rounds, at least h = 4 vertex voters must rank p ≻ d. But, in
order not to let an edge alternative obtain too much “support”, at most one of its “incident”
vertex voters can prefer p to d.
whose removal destroys all edges. We will give a concrete example for the reduction behind the
proof.
Let (G = (U,E), h) be a Vertex Cover instance, where U = {u1, . . . , ur} denotes the set of
vertices and E = {e1, . . . , es} denotes the set of edges. We assume that r ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ h ≤ r−1.
We construct a Possible Winner instance ((A, V ), p,B) as follows. The set A of alternatives
consists of the preferred alternative p, one helper alternative b, one dummy alternative d, and
for each edge ej ∈ E one edge alternative cj :
A := {p, b, d} ∪ {cj | ej ∈ E}.
We construct three groups of voters for the voter set V , where only the first group of voters
has partial orders while the remaining two groups of voters have linear orders. We let
−−−−−−−−→
A \ {p, b, d}
denote the order c1 ≻ c2 ≻ . . . ≻ cs.
1. For each vertex ui, we construct a vertex voter vi with a partial order specified by
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
A \ ({p, b, d} ∪ I(ui)) ≻ I(ui) ≻ d and
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
A \ ({p, b, d} ∪ I(ui)) ≻ I(ui) ≻ b ≻ p,
where
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
A \ ({p, b, d} ∪ I(ui)) denotes the order derived from
−−−−−−−−→
A \ {p, b, d} by removing ui’s
“incident” edge alternatives. Briefly put, vertex voter vi prefers all “non-incident” edge
alternatives to the remaining ones, but he regards every “incident” edge alternative and d
to be incomparable to b and to p.
2. We construct r − h− 1 auxiliary voters with the same linear order
p ≻
−−−−−−−−→
A \ {p, b, d} ≻ b ≻ d.
3. Finally, we construct another h auxiliary voters with the same linear order
p ≻ d ≻
−−−−−−−−→
A \ {p, b, d} ≻ b.
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Figure 2: A weighted majority graph (not including all arcs) for the profile (2r − 1 voters and
s+3 alternatives) in the reduced instance for Possible Winner with the amendment procedure
(see Definition 1 for the corresponding definition). Note that we use the same symbol for both
the alternative and its corresponding vertex because it will always be clear from the context
which one we mean. For instance, there is an arc from b to p with weight r because exactly r
voters prefer b to p. They all come from the first group of voters. We mark an arc (a, a′) bold if
there is majority of voters preferring a to a′. For the sake of brevity, some (irrelevant) arcs are
omitted. By ‘. . .” we refer to the remaining edge vertices in increasing order.
Note that we have constructed a total of 2r − 1 voters. Thus, given two alternatives a, a′,
we have that a beats a′ if and only if at least r voters prefer a to a′.
Let the partial agenda B be the linear order b⊲d⊲p⊲ cs ⊲ cs−1 ⊲ . . . ⊲ c1. This completes the
construction which can clearly be computed in polynomial time.
First, consider Figure 2 which illustrates the corresponding majority graph for the profile.
Let us briefly sketch the idea with the help of the majority graph: By the constructed agenda,
in order to become an amendment winner, our preferred alternative p has to beat every edge
alternative cj , 1 ≤ j ≤ s. By the auxiliary voters’ preference orders (also see the corresponding
weighted majority graph in Figure 2), exactly r − 1 voters prefer p to cj , 1 ≤ j ≤ s. Thus, we
have to put both p (and by the construction of the vertex voters, also b) in front of cj ≻ d in the
preference order of at least one vertex voter that corresponds to a vertex incident to the edge ej.
This implies that the vertices corresponding to the voters for which we put both p and b in front
of d form a vertex cover. Furthermore, since b beats p (see the corresponding arc weight in the
majority graph), d has to beat b in the first round of the procedure. Since all r − h − 1 voters
from the second group prefer b to d, we are only allowed to put b ≻ p in front of d in at most h
vertex voters’ preference orders. Thus, the vertex cover is of size at most h.
Now, we show that G has a vertex cover of size at most h if and only if p can possibly win
the amendment procedure.
For the “only if” part, assume that there is a vertex cover U ′ of size at most h. Then, we
complete the vertex voters’ preference orders to make p an amendment winner as follows.
1. For each vertex ui ∈ U ′ belonging to the vertex cover, we let vi have the preference order
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
A \ ({p, b, d} ∪ I(ui)) ≻ b ≻ p ≻
−−−→
I(ui) ≻ d.
2. For each vertex ui /∈ U ′ not belonging to the vertex cover, we let vi have the preference
order −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
A \ ({p, b, d} ∪ I(ui)) ≻
−−−→
I(ui) ≻ d ≻ b ≻ p.
Since |U \ U ′| ≥ r − h, at least r − h vertex voters prefer d to b. Together with the h voters
from the third group, which prefers d to b, d beats b and survives as the second round winner.
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Voter v1 : c2 ≻ c4≻ c6≻ c8 ≻{ c1≻ c3 ≻ c5≻ c7≻d, b≻p }
Voter v2 : c1 ≻ c2≻ c3≻ c4 ≻{ c2≻ c4 ≻ c6≻ c8≻d, b≻p }
Voter v3 : c3 ≻ c4≻ c5≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8≻{ c1≻ c2≻d, b≻p }
Voter v4 : c1 ≻ c2≻ c5≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8≻{ c3≻ c4≻d, b≻p }
Voter v5 : c1 ≻ c2≻ c3≻ c4 ≻ c7 ≻ c8≻{ c5≻ c6≻d, b≻p }
Voter v6 : c1 ≻ c2≻ c3≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6≻{ c7≻ c8≻d, b≻p }
Three voter: p≻ c1≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7≻ c8≻ b≻d
Two voters: p≻d≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3≻ c4≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7≻ c8 ≻ b
Agenda B : b⊲d⊲p⊲ c1 ⊲ c2 ⊲ c3⊲ c4⊲ c5 ⊲ c6 ⊲ c7⊲ c8
Table 3: The instance ((A, V ), p,B) for Possible Winner with the amendment procedure
where A = {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, p, d}, obtained from the graph in Figure 1 and h = 2, the
voter set V and the corresponding preference orders and the agenda are depicted above. By the
construction of the agenda, one may notice that in order to let p become an amendment winner,
at most h = 2 vertex voters can rank b ≻ p ≻ cj ≻ d for some cj . In order no beat every edge
alternative cj , at least one “incident” voter must rank b ≻ p ≻ cj .
Since we assume that h ≥ 1, at least one additional vertex voter prefers p to d. Together with
all r − 1 voters from the second and the third group that prefer p to d, p beats d and survives
as the third round winner. Since U ′ is a vertex cover, for each edge alternative cj , 1 ≤ j ≤ s,
there is at least one vertex voter preferring p to cj . This implies that p beats cj (note that all
r − 1 auxiliary voters prefer p to cj). Thus, p is an amendment winner.
For the “if” part, assume that p can possibly become an amendment winner which means
that one can complete the vertex voters’ preference orders, ensuring p’s victory. Let V ′ be the
set of vertex voters that prefer p to cj where cj is an arbitrary edge alternative. As we already
noticed, since p is in front of every edge alternative in the agenda, p must beat every edge
alternative. Thus, for each edge alternative cj , there is at least one vertex voter vi ∈ V ′ who
prefers p to cj . By the construction of our preference orders, this means that V
′ corresponds to
a vertex cover.
Now, observe that every vertex voter in V ′ also prefers b to d (because he originally prefers
b to p). Since all r − h− 1 auxiliary voters from the second group prefer b to d and since p can
only possibly win if b does not survive the second round (because b beats p), there are at most
h voters in V ′. This further implies that the vertex set corresponding to V ′ is a vertex cover of
size at most h.
We illustrate the above NP-hardness reduction through an example. Let us consider the
undirected graph depicted in Figure 1 again. We set h := 2 and the corresponding vertex cover
consists of the white vertices. Then a reduced instance for Possible Winner and for the
successive procedure will have 6 + (6− 2− 1) + 2 = 11 voters and 3 + 8 = 11 alternatives. This
instance can be found in Table 3.
We have just shown that it is NP-hard to decide whether alternative p can possibly be a successive
(or an amendment) winner under a fixed agenda (see Theorems 5 and 6). In both NP-hardness
reductions, however, the number m of alternatives and the number n of voters are unbounded.
We will show in the following that Possible Winner is fixed-parameter tractable (FPT, see
the textbooks of Cygan et al. [12], Downey and Fellows [13], Flum and Grohe [16], Niedermeier
[29] for more information on parameterized complexity theory) with respect to the parameter
“number m of alternatives”. That is, if m is a constant, then it is solvable in f(m) · poly(|I|)
time, where |I| is the size of a given instance of the problem and f is a computable function
that solely depends on m.
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First, we reduce Possible Winner to a special case of the integer linear programming (ILP)
problem [24]. In this special case, each input instance has f1(m) variables and f2(m) constraints,
and the maximum of the absolute values of the coefficients and of the constant terms is O(m ·
n) (recall that m denotes the number of alternatives and n the number of voters), where f1 and
f2 are two functions that only depend on m.
Theorem 7. Let m denote the number of alternatives and n the number of voters of a given
Possible Winner instance. Let ilp(ρ1, ρ2, ρ3) denote the running time of the feasibility problem
of an integer linear program which has ρ1 variables and ρ2 constraints, and where the maximum
of the absolute values of the coefficients and the constant terms is ρ3, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 ∈ N. Then,
Possible Winner can be solved in O(m! · ilp(m! · 2m
2
, 2m
2
+ m,n)) time for the successive
procedure and in O(m! ·mm · ilp(m! · 2m
2
, 2m
2
+ 3m, 2n)) time for the amendment procedure.
Proof. The general idea is to “guess” the completion of the agenda and the sequential outcome
of the voting regarding this agenda such that our preferred p may win and use integer linear
programs (ILP) to check whether the guess is valid.
First, we introduce some notation for the description of our ILP for both procedures. For
each partial order ≻, we write N(≻) to denote the number of voters with partial order ≻ in the
original profile and we write C(≻) to denote the set of all possible linear orders completing ≻.
For instance, if we have three alternatives a, b, c, then C({a, b} ≻ b) = {a ≻ b ≻ c, b ≻ a ≻ c}
and C(a ≻ b ≻ c) = {a ≻ b ≻ c}. Accordingly, for each linear order ≻∗, we write C−1(≻∗) to
denote the set of all partial orders that ≻∗ can complete.
For each partial order ≻ and each possible completion ≻∗∈ C(≻) of ≻, we introduce an
integer variable x(≻,≻∗). It denotes the number of voters with partial order ≻ in the input
profile that will have linear order ≻∗ in this profile’s completion. We use these variables for both
the successive and the amendment procedures.
Successive procedure. Suppose that L := a1⊲a2⊲ . . . ⊲ay ⊲ . . . ⊲am is the guessed agenda
with ay being our preferred alternative p. We need one more notation: For each alternative ai,
1 ≤ i ≤ m−1, let F (ai) denote the set of linear orders that prefer ai to the rest {ai+1, ai+2, . . . , am}.
Now, the crucial point is that our preferred alternative p is a successive winner under agenda L
if and only if the following two conditions hold.
1. The profile can be completed such that no alternative ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ y−1, is an {ai, ai+1, . . . , am}-
majority winner.
2. Alternative p is an {ay, ay+1, . . . , am}-majority winner.
We can describe these two conditions via a formulation for the ILP feasibility problem.
∑
≻∗∈C(≻)
x(≻,≻∗) = N(≻), ∀ partial orders ≻, (1)
∑
≻∗∈F (ai)
≻∈C−1(≻∗)
x(≻,≻∗) ≤
n
2
, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ y − 1, (2)
∑
≻∗∈F (p)
≻∈C−1(≻∗)
x(≻,≻∗) >
n
2
. (3)
First, Constraint (1) ensures that each voter’s partial order is completed to exactly one
linear order. Second, Constraints (2) and (3) correspond to Conditions 1 and 2, respectively.
The correctness of our ILP thus follows.
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For the running time, first of all, we brute-force search into all m! possible completions of
the input agenda. Then, for each of these completions, we run an ILP with at most m! · 2m
2
variables and at most 2m
2
+m constraints and where the absolute value of each coefficient and
the constant term is at most n.
Amendment procedure. As for the successive procedure, we guess a completion of the input
agenda. Apart from this, we also guess the amendment winners in each round. Suppose that
L := a1⊲a2⊲ . . . ⊲ay ⊲ . . . ⊲am is the guessed agenda with ay being our preferred alternative p,
and that for each 2 ≤ i ≤ y − 1, alternative bi ∈ {a1, a2, . . . , ai} is the guessed ith-round
amendment winner. (the first round amendment winner is by definition a1). Note that guessing
the amendment winner of a round higher than or equal to y is not necessary since the goal is to
make p the zth-round amendment winner with z ≥ y. Before we turn to the ILP formulation,
we first check in O(m) time whether the guessed amendment winners are valid, that is,
for each i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , y − 1} with bi 6= bi−1, it must hold that bi = ai.
The reason of this sanity check is that under the amendment procedure, an alternative c can
be an amendment winner of consecutive rounds and the only cause of a change of amendment
winners in two consecutive rounds i− 1 and i is that the ith alternative ai on the agenda beats
bi−1.
After this sanity check, we can use an ILP formulation to check whether a valid guess can
be realized by completing our partial profile. To this end, let ci ∈ {0, 1}, 2 ≤ i ≤ y − 1, be a
Boolean constant such that ci = 0 if ai = bi; otherwise ci = 1. Further, for each two distinct
alternatives a, b, let G(a, b) denote the set of all linear orders with a ≻ b. Our ILP formulation
consists of four groups of constraints:
∑
≻∗∈C(≻)
x(≻,≻∗) = N(≻), ∀ partial orders ≻, (4)
∑
≻∗∈G(bi−1,ai)
≻∈C−1(≻∗)
x(≻,≻∗) −
∑
≻∗∈G(ai,bi−1)
≻∈C−1(≻∗)
x(≻,≻∗) < ci · (n+ 1), ∀2 ≤ i ≤ y − 1, (5)
−
∑
≻∗∈G(bi−1,ai)
≻∈C−1(≻∗)
x(≻,≻∗) +
∑
≻∗∈G(ai,bi−1)
≻∈C−1(≻∗)
x(≻,≻∗) < (1− ci) · (n+ 1), ∀2 ≤ i ≤ y − 1, (6)
∑
≻∗∈G(p,ai)
≻∈C−1(≻∗)
x(≻,≻∗) −
∑
≻∗∈G(ai,p)
≻∈C−1(≻∗)
x(≻,≻∗) > 0, ∀y + 1 ≤ i ≤ m. (7)
The first group (Constraint (4)) ensures that each voter’s partial order is completed to exactly
one linear order. The second and the third groups of constraints make bi an i
th-round amendment
winner: If ai = bi, which means that if ci = 0, then the left-hand side of Constraint (5) is zero.
Hence, satisfying this constraint makes ai beat bi−1 (that is, the number of voters preferring ai
to bi−1 is larger than the number of voters preferring bi−1 to ai). Otherwise, ci = 1, the left-hand
side of Constraint (6) is zero. Hence, satisfying this constraint makes bi−1 beat ai (that is, the
number of voters preferring bi−1 to ai is greater than the number of voters preferring ai to bi−1).
The last group (Constraint (7)) ensures that for each i ∈ {y + 1, y + 2, . . . ,m}, the number of
voters preferring p to bi is greater than the number of voters preferring bi to p. The correctness
of our ILP formulation thus follows.
As to the running time, first of all, for each valid completion of the agenda and valid sequence
of the amendment winners (there are m! ·mm many), we run our ILP which has at most 2m
2
·m!
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variables and at most 2m
2
+3m constraints, and where the absolute value of each coefficient and
each constant term is at most 2n.
Using the famous result of Lenstra [24] (later improved by Kannan [21] and Frank and
Tardos [17]), which states that the feasibility problem of an integer linear program can be solved
in O(ρ
2.5ρ1+o(ρ1)
1 · |I|) time where ρ1 denotes the number variables and |I| the size of the integer
linear program, we can derive the following tractability result because an integer linear program
with ρ1 variables and ρ2 constraints, and whose coefficients and constant terms are between −ρ3
and ρ3, has O(ρ1 · ρ2 · log (ρ3 + 2)) input bits.
Corollary 2. Let m denote the number of alternatives and n the number of voters of a given
Possible Winner instance. Then, Possible Winner can be solved in O(ρ2.5ρ+o(ρ)+2·log (n+ 2))
time for the successive procedure and the amendment procedure, where ρ = m! · 2m
2
.
We close this section by remarking that the complexity result in in Corollary 2 of classification
nature only. It would be interesting to know whether our fixed-parameter tractability results
achieved through integer linear programming can also be achieved by a direct combinatorial
(fixed-parameter) algorithm (cf. Bredereck et al. [9, Key question 1]).
5.2 Necessary Winner
Different from the possible winner problem, notably, the successive and the amendment proce-
dures have different computational complexity regarding the necessary winner problem. Through-
out the rest of this section, we assume that a Necessary Winner instance (P = (A, V ), p,B)
is given.
Successive procedure. We first consider the successive procedure and show that deciding
whether our preferred alternative is (not) necessarily a successive winner can be solved in poly-
nomial time. We introduce one notion regarding the alternatives in a (possibly partial) agenda.
Definition 5. Given a (possibly partial) agenda B, for each alternative c ∈ A, let B⇐c be the
set of all alternatives c′ that are ordered in front of c by B, that is, c′⊲ c. Let B∼c be the set of
all alternatives c′ whose relative position to c are not specified by B, and let B⇒c be the set of all
alternatives c′ that are ordered behind c by B, that is, c⊲ c′.
Note that for each alternative c ∈ A, the three sets B⇐c , B
∼
c , and B
⇒
c are pairwise disjoint
and that B⇐c ∪ B
∼
c ∪ B
⇒
c = A \ {c}.
We derive the main idea behind our polynomial-time algorithm from the following simple
observation.
Observation 5. Alternative p is not a necessary successive winner if and only if there is a
completion (P∗,L) of the profile P and of the agenda B such that some other alternative may
win, that is, such that
1. p is not an (L⇒p ∪ {p})-majority winner or
2. there is an alternative c ∈ L⇐p that is an (L
⇒
c ∪ {c})-majority winner.
We will show that checking whether there is a completion satisfying one of the above condi-
tions can be done in polynomial time. First, we need one more notion and we need to reformulate
the above conditions.
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Definition 6. Let c be an arbitrary alternative. Consider a profile P∗ that completes the relative
order of each incomparable pair X of alternatives with c /∈ X in P according to an arbitrary but
fixed order. We call the profile P∗ a c-discriminating profile if for each alternative c′ with c′ 6= c
and for each voter v that thinks c′ and c are incomparable, P∗ completes v’s preference order to
satisfy c′ ≻ c. We call the profile P∗ a c-privileging profile if for each alternative c′ with c′ 6= c
and for each voter v that thinks c′ and c are incomparable, P∗ completes v’s preference order to
satisfy c ≻ c′.
Note that a c-discriminating (resp. c-privileging) profile is unique. We give an example to
illustrate these two concepts.
Example 4. Let P be a preference profile with four alternatives a, b, c, d, and two voters v1, v2
whose partial preference orders are specified as
v1 : b ≻ c ≻ d, v2 : d ≻ b.
Let the fixed order over the alternatives be a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d.
The profile whose voters’ preference orders are
v1 : a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d, v2 : a ≻ d ≻ b ≻ c.
is c-discriminating (unique).
The profile whose voters’ preference orders are
v1 : b ≻ c ≻ a ≻ d, v2 : c ≻ a ≻ d ≻ b.
is c-privileging (unique).
Now, we can rephrase Conditions 1 and 2 (from Observation 5) in a way that we can verify
them in polynomial time.
Lemma 3. There is a completion (P∗,L) of (P ,B) satisfying Condition 1 from Observation 5
if and only if p is not an (A \ B⇐p )-majority winner in the p-discriminating completion of P.
Proof. For the “only if” case, suppose that there is a completion (P∗,L) of (P ,B) that satisfies
condition 1. This means that more than half of the voters in P∗ do not prefer p to L⇒p . Since
L completes B, this implies that L⇒p ⊆ A \ (B
⇐
p ∪ {p}). Now, consider the p-discriminating
profile P∗∗. Since each voter in P∗∗ that does not prefer p to L⇒p will certainly not prefer p
to L⇒p in P
∗∗ (because this profile “discriminates” p), it must hold that more than half of the
voters in P∗∗ do not prefer p to L⇒p ⊆ A \ (B
⇐
p ∪ {p}). Thus, p is not an (A \ B
⇒
p )-majority
winner in P∗∗.
For the “if” case, suppose that p is not an (A \ B⇐p )-majority winner in the p-discriminating
profile P∗∗. Consider an arbitrary agenda L that satisfies
B⇐p ⊲p⊲ (B
∼
p ∪ B
⇒
p ).
We can easily verify that (P∗∗,L) satisfies Condition 1 because p is not a (B∼p ∪ B
⇒
p )-majority
winner.
Lemma 4. Assume that no completion of (P ,B) satisfies Condition 1. Then, there is a com-
pletion (P∗,L) of (P ,B) satisfying Condition 2 from Observation 5 if and only if there is some
alternative b ∈ B⇐p being a (B
⇒
b ∪ {b})-majority winner in the c-privileging completion of P.
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Algorithm 2: An algorithm checking whether p is a necessary successive winner.
Input: (P = (A, V ), p,B) — an instance of Necessary Winner
1 Compute the p-discriminating completion P∗ of P
2 if p is not an (A \ B⇐p )-majority winner in P
∗ then
3 return “no”
4 foreach alternative c ∈ B⇐p do
5 Compute the c-privileging completion P∗∗ of P
6 if c is a (B⇒c ∪ {c})-majority winner in P
∗∗ then
7 return “no”
8 return “yes”
Proof. For the “only if” case, suppose that (P∗,L) is a completion of (P ,B) which satisfies
Condition 2 and let c ∈ L⇐p be such an (L
⇒
c ∪ {c})-majority winner. This implies that c beats
p in P∗ because p ∈ L⇒c . Observe that c ∈ B
⇐
p ∪ B
∼
p holds because L completes B. If c ∈ B
∼
p
holds, that is, if B does not specify the relative order of c and p, then the same profile P∗ and
an agenda that completes B and that satisfies p⊲ c fulfills Condition 1 which is not possible by
our assumption. Thus, c ∈ B⇐p .
Now, we show that c is a (B⇒c ∪ {c})-majority winner in the c-privileging completion P
∗∗
of P . Observe that each voter v in P∗ that prefers c to L⇒c must also prefer c to B
⇒
c because
L completes B. Together with the assumption that c is an (L⇒c ∪ {c})-majority winner in P
∗,
this implies that more than half of the voters in P∗ prefer c to B⇒c . Since each voter in P
∗ that
prefers c to B⇒c will still prefer c to B
⇒
c in the c-privileging profile P
∗∗, more than half of the
voters in P∗∗ prefer c to B⇒c .
For the “if” case, suppose that B⇐p contains an alternative b that is a B
⇒
b ∪ {b}-majority
winner in the b-privileging completion P∗∗ of P . Now, consider an agenda L that completes B
and that satisfies
B⇐b ⊲B
∼
b ⊲ c⊲B
⇒
b .
We can easily verify that (P∗∗,L) satisfies Condition 2 (with respect to b).
Now, we have all ingredients to show that deciding on a necessary successive winner is
polynomial-time solvable.
Theorem 8. Necessary Winner can be solved in O(n ·m3) time for the successive procedure.
Proof. By Observation 5 and by Lemmas 3 and 4, we can conclude that p is not a necessary
winner if and only if
1. p is not an (A \ B⇐p )-majority winner in the p-discriminating completion of P or
2. there is an alternative c ∈ B⇐p being a (B
⇒
c ∪ {c})-majority winner in the c-privileging
completion of P .
We make a remark on the second requirement: A (B⇒c ∪ {c})-majority winner is not guar-
anteed to win the successive procedure because it could be the case that some other alternative
in front of it in the agenda already wins the majority. Nevertheless, p will not be a successive
winner in this case.
We describe our general approach in Algorithm 2, which checks whether one of the two
requirements is fulfilled. Fortunately, this can be done in polynomial time: Computing the p-
discriminating or the c-privileging completion for some alternative c ∈ A \ {p} takes O(n ·m2)
time and finding the majority winner also takes O(n ·m2) time. The algorithm iterates at most
m times through the loop in Steps (4)-(7). Altogether it takes O(n ·m3) time.
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Amendment procedure. Adapting the Vertex Cover reduction from the proof of Theo-
rem 6, we can show that Necessary Winner for the amendment procedure is coNP-hard.
Theorem 9. Necessary Winner is coNP-complete for the amendment procedure even with a
fixed agenda.
Proof. Recall that in the proof of Theorem 6 we constructed a profile P = (A, V ) with 2r − 1
voters and a fixed agenda B for a given instance (G = (U,E), h) of Vertex Cover, and we
showed that G admits a vertex cover of size at least (h + 1) if and only if p is not a possible
amendment winner. Further, our preferred alternative p is not a possible winner if and only
if the helper alternative b beats the dummy alternative d in every completion of the profile P .
Since all (r − 1) auxiliary voters and at least one vertex voter prefer each edge alternative to
alternative b, each edge alternative beats b. This implies that if b beats d in the second round,
then b will be deleted in the fourth round (note that b beats p in any case). Since every voter has
the same preference order c1 ≻ c2 ≻ . . . ≻ cs over all edge alternatives, edge alternative c1 beats
every remaining edge alternative cj, j 6= 1. This implies that c1 will necessarily win if and only
if p does not possibly win. Hence, the construction of Theorem 6 provides a polynomial-time
reduction from the coNP-complete Co-Vertex Cover problem to our Necessary Winner
problem for the amendment procedure.
Using the ILP formulation for Possible Winner with the amendment procedure (Theo-
rem 7), we can check whether there is a possible winner different from p. Since p is a necessary
winner if and only there is no other possible winner, using the results of Lenstra [24], Kannan
[21], and Frank and Tardos [17] we can conclude the following.
Corollary 3. Let m denote the number of alternatives and n the number of voters of a given
Necessary Winner instance. Then, Necessary Winner for the amendment procedure can
be solved in O(ρ2.5ρ+o(ρ)+2 · log (n+ 2)) time, where ρ = m! · 2m
2
.
5.3 The case of weighted voters
If each voter comes with a weight, then the possible winner and the necessary winner problems
for the amendment procedure are already NP-hard when the number of alternatives is three and
four, respectively [32, 23]. This is in contrast to the manipulation problem where the weighted
case is computationally “equivalent” to the non-weighted case: they are both polynomial-time
solvable. We show in the following results for the successive procedure
Theorem 10. Weighted Possible Winner for the successive procedure is weakly NP-complete
even for three alternatives and when the agenda B is linear.
Proof. We show NP-hardness by providing a polynomial-time reduction from the weakly NP-
complete Partition problem. Given a multi-set X = (x1, x2, . . . , xr) of positive integers,
Partition asks whether there is a perfect partition X1 ∪˙X2 = X of the integers such that both
parts sum up to the same value, that is,
∑
x∈X1
x =
∑
x∈X2
x.
Let X be a Partition instance with
∑
x∈X x = 2K. We construct a Possible Winner
instance ((A, V ), p,B) as follows. The set A of alternatives consists of the preferred alternative p
and two further alternatives a and b:
A := {p, a, b}.
The set V of voters consists of r number voters and one dummy voter:
1. For each integer xi ∈ X (which is positive), we construct one number voter vi with the
partial preference order specified by a ≻ p and with weight xi.
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2. We construct one additional dummy voter with the linear preference order p ≻ b ≻ a and
with weight 1.
Finally, the partial agenda B is set to a ≻ b ≻ p. This completes the construction which can
clearly be computed in polynomial time.
Before going into the details of the proof, observe that the total weight of all voters is 2K+1
and, hence, the majority quota is K + 1.
For the “only if” case, assume that there is a perfect partition X1 ∪˙X2 = X of the integers
such that
∑
x∈X1
x =
∑
x∈X2
x = K. Then, complete the profile as follows. For each number
voter vi, if xi ∈ X1, then the preference order of voter vi is a ≻ p ≻ b; otherwise, the preference
order of voter vi is b ≻ a ≻ p. By the sequence of the agenda B, a will be deleted because it is
not a majority winner (only the voters corresponding to the integers in X1 prefer a to {p, b}).
In the profile restricted to b and p, the dummy voter plus the voters that correspond to the
integers in X1 prefer p to b; the sum of their weights is 2K + 1. Thus, p beats b as a winner.
For the “if” case, assume that there is a completion P∗ of the profile such that p is a
successive winner. This implies that a is not a majority winner. Thus, by the preference order
of the dummy voter which has weight one, the sum of the weights of the number voters that
have preference order b ≻ a ≻ p is at least K. In the third round, p must beat b, which implies
that the sum of the weights of the number voters that have preference order b ≻ a ≻ p is at
most K. Summarizing, the number voters that have preference order b ≻ a ≻ p have a total
weight equal to K. The corresponding integers sum up to K.
As already mentioned in the beginning of Section 5.3, Pini et al. [32] and Lang et al. [23]
show that Necessary Winner is weakly NP-hard for the amendment procedure and for four
alternatives. We complement this result by showing that it is polynomial-time solvable for
the successive procedure, and it is linear-time solvable for the amendment procedure when the
number of alternatives is at most three.
Theorem 11. For the successive procedure, Weighted Necessary Winner can be solved in
O(n ·m3) time. For the amendment procedure, Weighted Necessary Winner can be solved
in linear time for up to three alternatives.
Proof. First, we observe that the algorithm (Theorem 8: Algorithm 2) that we provide to check
whether an alternative is a necessary successive winner in a profile without weights can be easily
adapted to also solve the case of weighted voters. Thus, for the successive procedure, Weighted
Necessary Winner can also be solved in O(n ·m3) time.
Now, we focus onWeighted Necessary Winner under the amendment procedure with up
to three alternatives. This is closely related to the problems of possible and necessary Condorcet
winner. To this end, for each two alternatives a and b, let w(a, b) be the sum of the weights of
those voters that prefer a to b.
We check all (up to) six completions L of the given partial agenda B and decide p to be
a necessary amendment winner only if all checks give answer “yes”. First, if the preferred
alternative p is at one of the first two positions in the agenda L, then the problem is equivalent
to asking whether alternative p is a necessary Condorcet winner, that is, whether all completions
of the preference orders can make p beat the other(s), one by one. The answer to the latter is
yes if and only if for each remaining alternative c, the sum of the weights of those voters that
prefer p to c is more than half of the total sum of weights. This can be checked in linear time.
We are left with the very last case where the profile has three alternatives, denoted by a,
b, and p, and where the preferred alternative p is at the third position in the agenda L. In
this case, p is a necessary winner if and only if none of the other two alternatives is a possible
Condorcet winner which can be checked in linear time; denote by K the total sum of the weights
of all voters:
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control vulnerability ratio
Successive Amendment
m ≤ 4 m ≥ 5 m ≤ 4 m ≥ 5
Arithmetic mean 0.157 0.081 0.000 0.035
Geometric mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 4: Experiments on agenda control with real-world data. We evaluate all 135 profiles
from Preflib that have linear preference orders and that have an odd number of voters each. We
consider profiles with m ≤ 4 and m ≥ 5 alternatives, respectively. The reason for this separation
is as follows. First, while a large number of profiles has either three or four alternatives (one
third each), for m ≥ 5, in most cases, less than five profiles have m alternatives. Second, the
results for profiles with up to four alternatives are pretty different from the other profiles.
(1) If the weights of the voters preferring a to b sum up to more than K/2 and if the weights of
the voters preferring p to a sum up to less than K/2, then we stop and answer “no”.
(2) If the weights of the voters preferring b to a sum up to more than K/2, and if the weights
of the voters preferring p to b sum up to less than K/2, then we stop and answer “no”.
(3) If the weights of the voters preferring p to a sum up to less than K/2 or the weights of the
voters preferring p to b sum up to less than K/2, then we answer “no”.
(4) Otherwise, we answer “yes”.
We can verify that if the condition in Step (1) (resp. in Step (2)) is satisfied, then a (resp. b) is a
possible winner, implying that p is not a necessary winner. If no condition in the first two steps
is satisfied, then there is a completion such that a beats b (or b beats a). In this case, if one of
the two conditions in the last step is satisfied, then the corresponding alternative can possibly
win, implying that p is not a necessary winner. Thus, the correctness follows.
6 Empirical Study
Our polynomial-time algorithms leave open how many alternatives can win through control
(or manipulation). We therefore investigate this empirically. To this end, we use the real-world
data from the Preflib collection of preference profiles due to Mattei and Walsh [25] to investigate
empirically the percentage of successful agenda control or manipulation. Since only one case of
the possible and the necessary winner problems is polynomial-time solvable and since Preflib
offers only a very restricted variant of incomplete preferences, we do not run experiments for
these two problems. Our results are shown in Tables 4 and 5.
6.1 Data Background
Preflib is a library for real-world preferences. The data is donated by various research groups.
Currently2, Preflib contains 314 profiles with complete preference orders: 100 of them have three
alternatives, 108 of them have four alternatives, one of them has 7 alternatives, and the remaining
105 profiles have between 9 and 242 alternatives. Among all profiles with complete preference
orders, 135 ones have an odd number of voters, where 56 of these have three alternatives, 52 of
these have four alternatives, one of these has 7 alternatives, and the remaining 26 profiles have
between 14 and 242 alternatives. The number of voters ranges from 5 to 14081.
2Accessed August 20th, 2015.
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Measurement
Successive Amendment
m ≤ 8 m ≥ 9 m ≤ 8 m ≥ 9
manipulation resistance ratio 0.455 0.945 0.402 0.924
2nd winner coalition ratio 0.288 0.523 0.222 0.468
smallest coalition ratio 0.263 0.386 0.221 0.385
Table 5: Experiments on manipulation with real-world data. We evaluate all 314 profiles from
Preflib that have linear preference orders. We consider profiles with m ≤ 8 and m ≥ 9 alter-
natives, respectively. The reason for this separation is that we only consider all m! possible
agendas when m ≤ 8. We use geometric mean to compute the average.
6.2 Agenda Control
For each of the 135 profiles with odd number of voters (note that, for reasons of simplicity,
we only implemented our algorithms for odd numbers of voters), using the algorithms behind
Theorems 1 and 2, we compute the number ms (resp. ma) of alternatives for which a successive
(resp. amendment) agenda control is possible. Then, we calculate the control vulnerability ratio
as
ms − 1
m− 1
and
ma − 1
m− 1
,
where m denotes the number of alternatives, respectively. Note that we have m− 1 here since
we factor out the alternative that wins originally. For instance, control vulnerability ratio 0.5
means that m−12 candidates are controllable. We use both arithmetic mean and geometric mean
to compute the average values among all profiles (see Table 4).
Our results show that the amendment procedure tends to be more resistant than the succes-
sive procedure: At most 3.5% of the alternatives have a chance to win the amendment procedure,
while it is 15.7% for the successive procedure.
6.3 Manipulation
Since Preflib does not offer any agenda, we have to generate a set X of agendas for manipulation
to obtain a good representation. The size of X depends on the number m of alternatives:
1. If m ≤ 8, then we let X be the set of all possible agendas, that is, |X | := m!.
2. Otherwise, we generate a set X of uniformly distributed random agendas with |X | :=
min(n2, 8!), where n denotes the number of voters in the input.
Then, for each alternative c and for each agenda L ∈ X , using the algorithms behind Theorems 3
and 4, we compute the minimum coalition size, that is, the minimum number of voters needed
to make c a successive (resp. an amendment) winner. Let this number for the successive (resp.
amendment) procedure be κs(P , c,L) (resp. κa(P , c,L)). This is upper-bounded by n+1. Then,
we calculate the manipulation resistance ratio as
∑
L∈X
∑
c∈C
κs(P , c,L)
|X | · (m− 1) · (n+ 1)
and
∑
L∈X
∑
c∈C
κa(P , c,L)
|X | · (m− 1) · (n+ 1)
.
Since most alternatives need a coalition of more than n voters to manipulate successfully,
which strongly affects the manipulation resistance ratio (see the first row in Table 5), we also
consider two related concepts:
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• The ratio of the 2nd winner coalition size, that is, the coalition size for the alternative that
becomes a winner after the original winner is removed. Formally, the 2nd winner coalition
ratio is defined as
∑
L∈X
κs(P , c∗,L)
|X | · (n+ 1)
and
∑
L∈X
κa(P , c∗,L)
|X | · (n+ 1)
,
where c∗ is a successive (resp. an amendment) winner after the original winner is removed.
• The ratio of the smallest coalition size, that is, the size σs(P ,L) (resp. σa(P ,L)) of the
smallest coalition that makes any alternative win. Formally, the smallest coalition ratio is
defined as
∑
L∈X
σs(P ,L)
|X | · (n+ 1)
and
∑
L∈X
σa(P ,L)
|X | · (n+ 1)
.
Our results show that successful manipulations with few voters are rare: For profiles with up to
eight alternatives the average coalition size is at least 0.4 · (n+1) (even the 2nd winner coalition
size is 0.2 · (n + 1); the smallest coalition size is only slightly lower), while for profiles with at
least five alternatives the average coalition size is almost n + 1 (even the 2nd winner coalition
size is roughly 0.5 · (n+ 1)).
7 Conclusion
Our work indicates that, from a computational perspective, the amendment procedure seems
superior to the successive procedure against agenda control and strategic voting. Our work
supports the claim that most European and Latin parliaments (cf. Apesteguia et al. [1]) should
rather go the Anglo-American way, that is, they should use amendment procedures instead of
successive procedures.
Following the spirit of Betzler et al. [7], it would be of interest to complement our compu-
tational hardness results for possible and necessary winner problems with a refined complexity
analysis concerning tractable special cases. For instance, our NP-hardness reductions for the
possible winner problems assume that voters may have arbitrary partial preferences. It would
be interesting to study whether this still holds if voter preferences are single-peaked or semi-
single-peaked [8].
For all our intractable problems, we obtain fixed-parameter tractability with respect to the
parameter “number m of alternatives”. With respect to the parameter “number n of voters”,
however, we could not settle their parameterized complexity.
It would be natural to also adopt a more game-theoretic view on the strategic voting scenarios
we considered. Finally, it would be also interesting to study further manipulation scenarios for
parliamentary voting procedures including, for example, candidate control as discussed by Rasch
[34].
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